

pedestals were erected for the new tower legs. They were also lengthened 18 feet to raise the tower steel above the Narrows' corrosive salt water.


Tower Elevations

The towers of the 1940 bridge

accomodated a two-lane road

deck. Tower legs for the 1950

bridge were designed for a four-lane road deck. Wider pier



1940 Bridge Roadway


Axonometrics Scale: 1/8" = 1'-0", 1:96

I he Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapsed on 7 November 1940 during a gale between 35 to 42 miles per hour, with a wind pressure of only five pounds per square foot. The steady wind's effects on the structure produced a fluctuating resultant force that synchronized in timing and direction with the bridge's natural harmonic motions (figs. 1&2), progressively amplifying them to destructive levels. Both vertical and torsional oscillations contributed to the failure of the bridge. The bridge's inherent weakness and susceptibility to these winds lay in its shallow stiffening girders and its narrow roadway.


Theodore von Karman, who had pioneered wind tunnel analysis at the California Institute of Technology, argued that the bridge deck's aerodynamic shape was a more important factor in its failure than its lightness and flexibility. Von Karman suspected that the bridge had experienced vortex shedding, a condition where objects like airplane wings or bridge decks displace air flowing around them and form eddies or vortices, which may induce vibration in the object (figs 3&4). He believed that wind flowing over the bridge's solid girder side plates created shedding that when

<u>Damping Mechanism</u> 1950 Bridge

Scale: 1/16" = 1'-0", 1:192




TRIM LINE



Elevation at Mid-Span

Lo eliminate torsional and vertical movement cylindrical hydraulic shock absorbers were used at three points on the bridge: coupling the top of the stiffening truss at mid-span with the suspension cables, connecting between the top chords of the main span and side span stiffening trusses, and extending as outriggers from the trusses' bottom chords to the towers.



1950 Bridge Roadway

combined with the flutter and resonance already present in the deck produced the violent oscillations that caused the catastrophic failure (figs. 5&6).

Designing the replacement bridge's deck stiffening system involved subjecting dynamic scale models to wind tunnel testing to better understand wind effects on them.

Designers for the 1950 bridge were not satisfied with their ability to eliminate torsional and vertical movements in their proposed structure. They hoped to enhance their design's natural damping ability with mechanical devices. One of these was a double-lateral bracing system in the stiffening truss. It increased torsional frequency motion and tortional stiffness.




FIGURE 6